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REPLACEMENT OR REDUCTION OF GENEEDITED ANIMALS IN BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH: A COMPARATIVE ETHICS AND
POLICY ANALYSIS*
MATTHIAS EGGEL** & REBECCA L. WALKER***
Since William Bateson’s 1906 coinage of the term “genetics,” the
rise of mice as a model organism for biomedical research has
gone hand in hand with genomic developments. In today’s
research environment, mice and rats make up the vast majority of
all research subjects. While the advent of gene-editing tools such
as CRISPR has made genetic manipulation of mice easier, these
tools also signal a new trend toward an increased use of largeanimal models such as dogs, pigs, and nonhuman primates.
Especially for neurological impairments, CRISPR gene editing
offers the potential to generate large-animal models that better
mimic human diseases. What are the ethical and regulatory
implications of this trend? The professional and ethical
framework for responsible conduct of animal research is widely
recognized as the “three Rs”: Reduction, Refinement, and
Replacement. This Article points to the tension between
reduction (decreasing the overall numbers of animals used) and
relative replacement (the use of mice and rats instead of species
with more “complex” capacities) that is implied by such a tradeoff. The Article argues, however, that a comparative analysis of
regulatory frameworks in the United States and in the European
Union shows that neither offers any substantial guidance to
moderate a trend toward greater use of large-animal models.
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Nevertheless, we raise several ethical questions associated with
the trend toward using relatively fewer animals but replacing less
cognitively developed animals with those with potentially greater
morally relevant capacities and moral standing.
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INTRODUCTION
In today’s biomedical research environment, mice and rats
account for the vast majority of animals used.1 While the advent of
new gene-editing tools such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short
1. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: SEVENTH REPORT ON THE STATISTICS ON THE
NUMBER OF ANIMALS USED FOR EXPERIMENTAL AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES IN
THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 3 (2013), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
resource.html?uri=cellar:e99d2a56-32fc-4f60-ad69-61ead7e377e8.0001.03/DOC_1&format=
PDF [https://perma.cc/72B2-JF85]. Because only some countries collect statistics on the
numbers of animals used generally, and rodents in particular, estimates of actual
percentages of mice and rats vary as compared to other mammals. Katy Taylor et al.,
Estimates for Worldwide Laboratory Animal Use in 2005, 36 HUMANE SOC’Y INST. FOR
SCI. & POL’Y ANIMAL STUD. REPOSITORY 327, 327–28 (2008).
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Palindromic Repeats (“CRISPR”) paired with specific nucleases (e.g.,
Cas) has made genetic manipulation of mice easier, they also portend
a new trend toward an increased use of large-animal models such as
dogs, pigs, and nonhuman primates (“NHPs”), among others.2 These
gene-editing tools offer the potential to generate large-animal models
that better mimic human diseases and are thus potentially more
translatable to human medicine.3
The responsible conduct of animal research has largely been
based on the idea of the “three Rs” of reduction, replacement, and
refinement of animal research.4 Reduction aims to minimize the
number of animals used to those needed for the scientific endeavor.
Replacement works to substitute the use of live animals with
alternative models, such as computer-based simulation or in vitro
studies. Refinement involves lessening harms to animals used in
research through changes to research procedures, improved
management of pain and distress, and improved housing and
caretaking. Within the broader replacement framework, partial or
relative replacement envisions substituting cognitively higherdeveloped animals with cognitively less-developed animals.5 This is
based on the idea that more cognitively developed species have an
increased sentience and a greater ability to suffer.6
A core professional ethics problem regarding the greater use of
gene-edited large-animal models is the tension between reduction and
relative replacement. According to relative replacement, there would
typically be an incentive to replace larger animals with smaller species
if they are also less cognitively developed.7 However, since far fewer
2. See Aaron C. Ericsson, Marcus J. Crim & Craig L. Franklin, A Brief History of
Animal Modeling, 110 MO. MED. 201, 203–04 (2013). The advances of gene editing are
especially remarkable given that the study of genetics is itself a relatively new academic
specialty, as William Bateson coined the term “genetics” only in 1906. KAREN RADER,
MAKING MICE: STANDARDIZING ANIMALS FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, 1900–1955, at
27–28 (2004).
3. Alexandra Wendler & Martin Wehling, The Translatability of Animal Models for
Clinical Development: Biomarkers and Disease Models, 10 CURRENT OPINION
PHARMACOLOGY 601, 605 (2010).
4. See generally W. M. S. RUSSELL & R. L. BURCH, THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANE
EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIQUE 64 (1959) (discussing “the ways in which inhumanity can be
. . . diminished or removed . . . under the three broad headings of Replacement, Reduction,
and Refinement” (emphasis omitted)).
5. Nicole Fenwick, Gilly Griffin & Clément Gauthier, The Welfare of Animals Used
in Science: How the “Three Rs” Ethic Guides Improvements, 50 CANADIAN VETERINARY
J. 523, 523 (2009).
6. See id.
7. Id.
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large animals would be used in gene-edited disease-model studies
than, for example, the number of mice that would be used in these
studies, reduction argues in favor of using gene-edited large-animal
models.8 How should this tension between reduction and relative
replacement be resolved? To put the point in sharp relief: If possible,
should we trade a study using one thousand rodents for a potentially
more translatable study using ten NHPs, dogs, or pigs?
The three Rs have been crucial to structuring regulatory
guidance for animal research, especially in the European Union but
also in the United States.9 In this Article, we investigate the
comparative regulatory implications in the United States and
European Union of genetically modifying large animals to better
model human diseases and the increased research uses of large
animals that might follow. Outside of specific restrictions regarding
the use of some species (particularly great apes and, to a much lesser
extent, other NHPs), there is little within the U.S. or E.U. regulatory
and professional ethics frameworks that offers guidance in terms of
the ethical permissibility of the trade-offs between using large
numbers of rodents and small numbers of large-animal models that
we suggest may be on the horizon. While there is no substantive
regulatory guidance on this issue, there is reason to believe that the
general ethos of animal research ethics would favor the trend. At the
same time, other considerations, such as the cost of research
conducted with large animals and difficulties in procuring species of
NHP, may dampen this trend somewhat.10 Since regulatory guidance
8. Id.
9. Council Directive 2010/63, pmbl. ¶ 11, 2010 O.J. (L 276) 33, 34 [hereinafter
Council Directive 2010/63]; Larry Carbone, Pain in Laboratory Animals: The Ethical and
Regulatory Imperatives, 6 PLOS ONE, no. e21578, Sept. 7, 2011, at 1, 1–2.
10. Emily W. Lankau et al., Use of Nonhuman Primates in Research in North
America, 53 J. AM. ASS’N FOR LABORATORY ANIMAL SCI. 278, 280–81 (2014). It is too
early to tell how prevalent the trend toward greater use of large-animal models will
become. According to data available through the U.S. Department of Agriculture on
numbers of animals used in research, a comparison between 2012 (when CRISPR-Cas9
was developed specifically as a gene-editing tool) and 2017 (the most recent year for which
data is available) shows the numbers of dogs used rose by less than 1%, sheep use rose by
approximately 6%, and pig use dropped by approximately 11%. However, NHP use rose
by approximately 15%. Compare ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., USDA,
ANNUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2014) [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2012], www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/
downloads/reports/Animals%20Used%20In%20Research%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BH5F-5X8L], with ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., USDA, ANNUAL
REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT
ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2017], https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/
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on an increased use of genetically modified large mammals within
biomedicine is sparse, we do briefly note broader social and ethical
conundrums that the trend raises.
The discussion proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the
scientific landscape in which large-animal models play an increasingly
important role in research. Part II focuses on the regulatory and
professional ethical frameworks guiding animal research in the
United States and in the European Union, particularly emphasizing
differences between the two jurisdictions that suggest inconsistencies
in their moral approach to animal research. Part III introduces the
issue of moral standing for the animals subject to genetic and other
biomedical studies and illustrates how the U.S. and E.U. regulatory
frameworks approach the issue. Part IV then analyzes the
implications of these policy differences for the use of gene-edited
large-animal models. Finally, Part V introduces moral considerations
that have not yet been accommodated in the regulatory and
professional ethical frameworks governing gene-edited animal
research to offer some introductory thoughts on how existing
frameworks could be improved.
I. GENE EDITING AND EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE LARGE-ANIMAL
MODELS
The scientific basis for a potential turn to a greater use of geneedited large-animal models consists of two factors. First, there is
broad agreement that there is a need to improve current animal
models to increase efficiency and translatability of animal research.11
While rodents have long served as models for human diseases,
knowledge gained through their use in biomedical research may be
less translatable to humans than knowledge gained through the use of
larger mammals that are otherwise generally more similar to
humans.12 Second, CRISPR gene editing represents a new tool with
unprecedented capacity to efficiently and effectively manipulate the

downloads/reports/Annual-Report-Animal-Usage-by-FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9CCD3C9]. Importantly, it is impossible to tell what portion of that use is related to genome
editing. Compare ANNUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2012, supra, with
ANNUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2017, supra.
11. See Hideyuki Okano & Noriyuki Kishi, Investigation of Brain Science and
Neurological/Psychiatric Disorders Using Genetically Modified Non-Human Primates, 50
CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 1, 1 (2018).
12. Id.
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genomes of animal models, including large mammals.13 Because larger
animals have significant potential to better model human diseases
than smaller animals and are typically used in much fewer numbers
than smaller animals, they offer the potential for a dramatic change in
the translatability and efficiency of animal research.14
Rodents are easy to breed, relatively short-lived, efficient to
house and manage, and there are well-established gene-manipulation
techniques for these animals.15 The expanded use of mice in the early
decades of genetics also largely managed to escape social critique in
part because the initial uses were primarily for genetic breeding
purposes and also because the antivivisectionist movement of the
time was focused on scientists’ use of dogs and cats.16 These factors all
contribute to mice being a model of choice for many biomedical
researchers today.
Limitations in the model are nevertheless becoming more widely
recognized and discussed. For example, while rodents have
contributed greatly to our understanding of human biology and
development, there are also significant differences between mice and
humans that limit their usefulness as models of human diseases.17
These differences include physical size, life span, diet, differences in
brain and other organ structure and function, and genomic
differences. Each of these factors may limit the translational potential
of rodent studies to human clinical application.18 Mouse studies of
diseases such as cystic fibrosis, Lesch-Nylan syndrome, and
Huntington’s disease illustrate the shortcomings of the mouse model,
as animals carrying genetic mutations relevant to the human disease
phenotype nevertheless do not show all the same symptoms that a

13. Ellen Shrock & Marc Güell, CRISPR in Animals and Animal Models, in 152
PROGRESS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY AND TRANSLATIONAL SCIENCE 95, 95–114 (Raúl
Torres-Ruiz & Sandra Rodriguez-Perales eds., 2017) (discussing large mammal
applications and noting CRISPR has “revolutionized the field of genome editing”).
14. Id.
15. See Herbert C. Morse III, Building a Better Mouse: One Hundred Years of
Genetics and Biology, in 1 THE MOUSE IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: HISTORY, WILD
MICE, AND GENETICS 1, 7–8 (James G. Fox et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
16. RADER, supra note 2, at 35–37.
17. Robert L. Perlman, Mouse Models of Human Disease: An Evolutionary
Perspective, EVOLUTION, MED. & PUB. HEALTH, April 12, 2016, at 170, 170.
18. Id. at 171–74; see also Okano & Kishi, supra note 11, at 1; H. Bart van der Worp et
al., Can Animal Models of Disease Reliably Inform Human Studies?, 7 PLOS MED., no.
e1000245, Mar. 30, 2010, at 1, 5–6.
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human will show.19 Thus, what we learn with regard to treating the
symptoms in the animal model may be of limited help for the human
clinic.
Critically, a significant percentage of potential new drugs are
removed from development because of a lack of efficacy and/or safety
when tested in humans.20 High attrition rates have been reported for
multiple fields, including neurological diseases, oncology, and
infectious diseases.21 While there are diverse explanations for these
high rates of drug attrition, including poor study design, inadequate
animal models of the human diseases are frequently cited.22
The low rates of translatability explain why there is an increasing
interest in using larger-animal models that may better mimic the
course and potential cures of human diseases.23 While multiple largeanimal models have been used in the study of diseases with genomic
factors, dogs, pigs, and NHPs have all been singled out as particularly
promising for certain types of diseases.24 Generally speaking, the life
span of larger mammals is more similar to humans, a factor that is
important for the onset and development of many human disease

19. C. Bruce A. Whitelaw et al., Engineering Large Animal Models of Human
Disease, 238 J. PATHOLOGY 247, 247 (2015).
20. Paul McGonigle & Bruge Ruggeri, Animal Models of Human Disease: Challenges
in Enabling Translation, 87 BIOCHEMICAL PHARMACOLOGY 162, 163 (2014); van der
Worp et al., supra note 18, at 1.
21. Jarrod Bailey, Michelle Thew & Michael Balls, An Analysis of the Use of Animal
Models in Predicting Human Toxicology and Drug Safety, 42 ALTERNATIVES TO
LABORATORY ANIMALS 181, 196 (2014); Ismail Kola & John Landis, Can the
Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition Rates?, 3 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY
711, 712–14 (2004); Ian Walker & Herbie Newell, Do Molecularly Targeted Agents in
Oncology Have Reduced Attrition Rates?, 8 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 15, 16
(2009).
22. See Melanie L. Graham & Mark J. Prescott, The Multifactorial Role of the 3Rs in
Shifting the Harm-Benefit Analysis in Animal Models of Disease, 759 EUR. J.
PHARMACOLOGY 19, 21, 23–24 (2015); see also Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the
Decline in Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency, 11 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 191,
194–95 (2012).
23. See Ericsson et al., supra note 2, at 203.
24. Margaret Casal & Mark Haskins, Large Animal Models and Gene Therapy, 14
EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 266, 267 (2006); Whitelaw et al., supra note 19, at 247. See
generally Sandrine Camus et al., Why Bother Using Non-Human Primate Models of
Cognitive Disorders in Translational Research?, 124 NEUROBIOLOGY LEARNING &
MEMORY 123 (2015) (explaining that NHPs particularly “remain critical for the
accumulation of biomedical knowledge given that they are the closest resemblance to
humans in aspects of anatomy, physiology, immunology, social behaviours, and cognitive
function”).
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phenotypes.25 For specific large-animal models, there are also other
close similarities to humans, including organ physiology, brain
structures, and behavioral and social capacities.26 Pigs are used in
diabetes research, for example, because of certain physiological
similarities to humans. Current bioengineering of pigs at a molecular
level to more closely mimic human diabetes is considered highly
promising for biomedicine.27 NHPs, on the other hand, may better
mimic human neurodegenerative diseases due to similarities in brain
structure.28 The primate prefrontal cortex is a recently evolved brain
structure responsible for higher cognitive processes and is vulnerable
with regard to some psychiatric diseases.29 Because rodent brains do
not share the unique structure and function of the primate prefrontal
cortex, it is impossible to fully model the complexity of the human
brain in rodents.30 Thus, even genetically modified rodents may not
adequately model some human neurodegenerative diseases. For
example, while a Parkin gene mutation in humans is a common cause
of early-onset familial Parkinson’s disease, a similar mutation of the
Parkin gene in mice leads to incomplete mimicking of the Parkinson’s
disease symptoms in these patients.31 Rodent models of other
neurodegenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer’s and Huntington’s
diseases, show similar limitations by lacking the typical
neurodegeneration that is so significant in human patients.32
In sum, the turn to genome-edited large-animal models of
disease is driven in part by a promise of better translation to
treatment of certain human diseases and conditions. What makes the
25. See Ilaria Bellantuono & Paul K. Potter, Modelling Ageing and Age-Related
Disease, 20 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 27, 27, 31 (2016) (noting the “complex problem”
of modeling diseases in smaller animals and the insufficiency of data without models of
longer life span).
26. So Gun Hong et al., The Role of Nonhuman Primate Animal Models in the
Clinical Development of Pluripotent Stem Cell Therapies, 24 MOLECULAR THERAPY 1165,
1165 (2016).
27. Eckhard Wolf et al., Genetically Engineered Pig Models for Diabetes Research, 23
TRANSGENIC RES. 27, 27 (2014).
28. Camus et al., supra note 24, at 124–25; Casal & Haskins, supra note 24, at 267;
Whitelaw et al., supra note 19, at 247.
29. Okano & Kishi, supra note 11, at 1.
30. Id.
31. See Jean-Michel Itier et al., Parkin Gene Inactivation Alters Behaviour and
Dopamine Neurotransmission in the Mouse, 12 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 2277, 2285–
86 (2003).
32. Zhuchi Tu et al., CRISPR/Cas9: A Powerful Genetic Engineering Tool for
Establishing Large Animal Models of Neurodegenerative Diseases, 10 MOLECULAR
NEURODEGENERATION, no. 35, Aug. 4, 2015, at 1, 1–2.
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turn possible, however, are the significant improvements in genomeediting technologies. Earlier methods of producing genetically
modified large-animal models of human diseases offered generally
low rates of success and were highly inefficient.33 However, the newer
gene editors using site-specific nucleases are able to better target loci
within the genome to both “knock-in” and “knockout” specific
genes.34 In particular, CRISPR paired with specific nucleases35
potentially offers an effective and efficient way of cheaply modifying
DNA at specific locations and has led to the development of multiple
new animal models with more extensive genomic modifications than
earlier methods.36 Because these newer gene editors are efficient in
introducing accurate mutations in both alleles of the same gene and
can be used directly in reproductive cells, they make possible the
development of larger animal models of specific human diseases that
were previously impossible, including in sheep, pigs, dogs, and
NHPs.37 In sum, CRISPR gene editing is seen as a potent strategy to
broaden “the repertoire of useful animal disease models significantly
beyond that currently available.”38
The scientific promise of large-animal models, along with the
technological capacity to generate these models, helps to explain why
a turn to their increased use may be on the horizon. Yet animals used
in biomedical research may undergo painful and distressing
interventions, are commonly euthanized at the conclusion of a study
(or at a humane endpoint to a study), and live their lives confined to a
research facility.39 Insofar as the use of animals in biomedical research
33. James West & William Warren Gill, Genome Editing in Large Animals, 41 J.
EQUINE VETERINARY SCI. 1, 2 (2016).
34. Whitelaw et al., supra note 19, at 248.
35. The CRISPR/Cas9 system utilizes nuclease (protein that cuts DNA) and a guiding
sequence (genetic base pairs that direct the nuclease to the gene locus of choice) that can
efficiently cut DNA at targeted sites to induce mutations or to introduce specific DNA
sequences into said target locus. See Mazhar Adli, The CRISPR Tool Kit for Genome
Editing and Beyond, 9 NATURE COMM., no. 1911, May 15, 2018, at 1, 2–3 (outlining the
development of gene-editing science).
36. Shrock & Güell, supra note 13, at 95–114.
37. Jon Cohen, In Dogs, CRISPR Fixes a Muscular Dystrophy, 361 SCIENCE 835, 835
(2018); Xiangyu Guo & Xiao-Jiang Li, Targeted Genome Editing in Primate Embryos, 25
CELL RES. 767, 767–68 (2015); Carolin Perleberg, Alexandre Kind & Angelika Schnieke,
Genetically Engineered Pigs as Models for Human Disease, 11 DISEASE MODELS &
MECHANISMS, no. 030783, Jan. 22, 2018, at 1, 1; Whitelaw et al., supra note 19, at 247;
Diarra K. Williams et al., Genetic Engineering a Large Animal Model of Human
Hypophosphatasia in Sheep, 8 SCI. REP., no. 16945, Nov. 16, 2018, at 1, 1–2.
38. Whitelaw et al., supra note 19, at 253.
39. See Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶¶ 14–15, at 34.
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is justifiable, it is arguable that, at a minimum, a professional ethical
responsibility exists to maximize the potential benefits from such use.
From a responsible conduct-of-research point of view, then, the
increase in efficiency and translatability that large-animal models
seem to offer suggests a strong argument in favor of using these
models. At the same time, using these animals is typically seen as
morally problematic because of their relatively high social,
intellectual, and emotional capacities—capacities that more closely
mirror our own. In what follows, this Article analyzes the implications
of a trend toward using more gene-edited large-animal models from a
regulatory and professional ethics framework.
II. THE U.S. AND E.U. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR ANIMAL
RESEARCH
This Article applies a comparative analysis to the animal
research regulatory frameworks of the United States and European
Union. These two regulatory structures are among the most stringent
and influential in the world with regard to research oversight and
accordingly present an opportunity to examine the extent to which
helpful guidance is available on the CRISPR-driven turn to largeanimal uses. As we discuss, the E.U. framework offers somewhat
stronger language for animal protection and valuation and contains
elements not found in the U.S. legislation, such as a required harmbenefit analysis and an upper limit on allowable pain and distress.40
Nevertheless, as we analyze these and other elements of each
framework, we reveal that neither the E.U. nor the U.S. framework
offers particular guidance on the use of larger versus smaller geneedited animal models. Accordingly, the dilemma we raise in this
Article regarding the tension between reduction and relative
replacement remains unaddressed. In particular, neither the United
States nor the European Union would prohibit—and both might be
viewed as conducive to—the turn to greater use of gene-edited larger
animals for biomedical research.
A. E.U. Regulation
In the European Union, research using nonhuman animals is
guided by Directive 2010/63 on the Protection of Animals Used for
Scientific Purposes (“Directive 2010/63”).41 Directive 2010/63
40. Id. pmbl. ¶ 23, art. 38, at 35, 46–47.
41. Id. pmbl. ¶ 1, at 33.
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harmonizes animal research legislation across E.U. member-states
and was implemented in the form of national laws by each state in
2013.42 It covers research uses of vertebrate animals and cephalopods,
as well as fetal forms of mammals in the last third of their
development.43 Animal research proceeds through approval from
authorities appointed in each member-state.44 Referred to as
“competent authorities,” these officials make decisions about whether
to authorize research projects based on a harm-benefit analysis and
under advisement of an ethical review committee, among other
criteria.45 Also, a national committee of each E.U. member-state
advises both the competent authority and the local animal-welfare
groups and serves as a clearinghouse for information on best practices
for “acquisition, breeding, accommodation, [and the] care and use of
animals in procedures.”46
B.

U.S. Regulation

In the United States, the regulatory structure guiding animal
research is somewhat more complex because there is both a federal
law, the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”),47 as well as the Public Health
Service (“PHS”) policy, revised in 2015,48 that covers federally funded
research as mandated by the Health Research Extension Act of
1985.49 The AWA is administered by the United States Department
of Agriculture (“USDA”), specifically the Animal Care unit within
the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”),
and covers a wide range of issues in the transportation, sale, and
handling of animals generally.50 The AWA includes standards for
humane care and use for animals in a wide variety of contexts far

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. pmbl. ¶¶ 8–9, at 34.
Id. pmbl. ¶ 48, at 37.
Id.
Id. art. 49, at 49.
7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012).
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE POLICY ON HUMANE CARE AND USE OF LABORATORY ANIMALS 7
(2015)
[hereinafter
PHS
POLICY],
https://olaw.nih.gov/sites/default/files/
PHSPolicyLabAnimals.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G8D-BUUE].
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 289(d) (2012).
50. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., USDA, ANIMAL WELFARE ACT
AND ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS 1 (2017), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_
welfare/downloads/AC_BlueBook_AWA_FINAL_2017_508comp.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3JQD-DD2T].
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beyond animal research.51 By its terms, the AWA extends protections
to research animals, including warm-blooded vertebrate animals,
except birds, mice, and rats bred for research.52 The PHS policy is
administered by the National Institutes of Health’s Office of
Laboratory Animal Welfare (“OLAW”).53 It covers all research uses,
experimentation, research training, and biological testing of live
vertebrate animals sponsored (or conducted) by PHS agencies.54
Unlike the E.U. legislation, it does not cover any fetal forms of
animals nor does it cover any invertebrates.55
The AWA and PHS policies are similar in a number of ways,
perhaps most significantly by requiring oversight of research by
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (“IACUCs”)—
though they impose somewhat different membership requirements—
and through the requirement for adequate veterinary care.56 IACUCs
review the research facility’s programs, inspect animal facilities and
laboratories, and approve individual research protocols among other
duties.57 The PHS policy also requires conformity of research
practices with the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals
(“the Guide”)58 and with the U.S. Government Principles for the
Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals Used in Testing,
Research, and Training (the “U.S. Government Principles”).59
An important difference between the AWA and PHS regulations
pertains to facility inspection requirements. The USDA conducts
unannounced on-site inspections of facilities doing research with
covered species at least yearly, while the PHS policy relies on
inspections of the facilities (at least every six months) by IACUCs
and a written assurance submitted by the institution regarding their

51. 7 U.S.C. § 2144 (2012).
52. Id. § 2132(g).
53. PHS POLICY, supra note 48, at 9.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 8.
56. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (2012).
57. 9 C.F.R. § 2.31 (2018).
58. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., GUIDE FOR
THE CARE AND USE OF LABORATORY ANIMALS (8th ed. 2011) [hereinafter GUIDE FOR
CARE AND USE], https://grants.nih.gov/grants/olaw/guide-for-the-care-and-use-of-laboratoryanimals.pdf [https://perma.cc/DSG2-GKHH] (addressing ethical research practices with
animals in accordance with the three Rs).
59. U.S. Government Principles for Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals Used
in Testing, Research and Training, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,864, 20,864 (May 20, 1985).
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compliance with PHS policies.60 Another significant difference is
which animals are covered. Because mice and rats bred for research
are not covered by the AWA, their use is not reported to the USDA.
Therefore, it remains unknown precisely how many of these animals
are used for research in the United States. However, because
estimates are that eighty-five to ninety-five percent of vertebrate
animals used are mice or rats, it is significant that these animals are
not covered by the AWA.61 In the United States, therefore, certain
vertebrate animals used for privately funded research in a facility not
voluntarily accredited might receive no oversight protections.
C.

Nongovernmental Regulation

A third aspect of the oversight picture of animal research
internationally is the option of voluntary accreditation and
assessment by the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of
Laboratory Animal Care International (“AAALAC International”),
a private nonprofit organization founded in 1965 that promotes
uniform high standards of animal care and use.62 AAALAC
International accreditation requires an application process and an
initial site visit.63 Maintaining accreditation involves yearly updates as
well as site visits (with notice) every three years.64 AAALAC
International assessments rely on both U.S. and E.U. guidelines,
though the accreditation generally resembles the Guide in the United
States by using a performance standard that looks to outcomes and
professional judgment for its assessment of research programs.65

60. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND
ANIMALS 33–34 (2004) [hereinafter SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND ANIMALS].
61. The U.S. National Association for Biomedical Research, a lobbying group that
advocates for the use of animals in research, estimates ninety-five percent of vertebrates
used are mice and rats. Mice and Rats, NAT’L ASS’N FOR BIOMEDICAL RES.,
https://www.nabr.org/biomedical-research/laboratory-animals/species-in-research/mice-andrats/ [https://perma.cc/B7UN-J4MF]. The Humane Society of the United States, which
advocates for an eventual end to the harmful use of animals in research, estimates that
mice and rats comprise eighty-five to ninety percent of vertebrates used in research.
Questions and Answers About Biomedical Research, HUMANE SOC’Y U.S.,
https://www.humanesociety.org/resources/questions-and-answers-about-biomedical-research
[https://perma.cc/FJG3-YHLR].
62. SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND ANIMALS, supra note 60, at 32.
63. Accreditation, AAALAC INT’L, https://www.aaalac.org/accreditation/steps.cfm
[https://perma.cc/MJ48-Z9SY].
64. Id.
65. GUIDE FOR CARE AND USE, supra note 58; Accreditation, supra note 63.
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III. ANIMAL MORAL STATUS IN U.S. AND E.U. REGULATORY
GUIDANCE
The U.S. and E.U. regulatory structures guiding animal research
are similar in terms of rigor and overall aim—protection of animal
welfare within the constraints introduced by the needs of science.
However, these systems differ in ways that are significant, at least in
principle, for considering the moral status of animals in a research
setting.66 The difference between the U.S. and E.U. regulatory
structures regarding animal moral status is not explicitly addressed in
either set of regulatory guidance. Regulations in the United States
demonstrate that some particularly harmful research, such as
exposure to pathogens or radiation, is permissible in animals because
“it would be unethical to deliberately expose healthy human
volunteers.”67 Other than by this implied lower moral status in
comparison to human subjects, however, the U.S. laws and policies
generally avoid reference to the moral standing of animals used in
research. What then are the grounds for stating that the two
regulatory structures have different animal moral status implications?
Here we briefly note four bases for this claim: first is the regulatory
language describing the value of animals; second is the E.U.
requirement for a harm-benefit analysis for protocol approval; third is
the E.U. requirement that an upper limit be placed on pain and
distress for research animals; and fourth is the particular protection
the United States affords to certain species.
A. Regulatory Language Describing the Value of Animals
Regulators presumably take guidance on the moral status of
research animals from institutional mandates that reflect their
government’s values or priorities. In the United States, the Guide
requires that “all who care for, use, or produce animals for research,
testing, or teaching must assume responsibility for their well-being.”68
While this sounds like a promotion of animal moral status, it is
66. By “moral status” this Article means consideration owed by ethical agents to “the
needs, interests, or well-being” of animals by virtue of the kinds of creatures they are. See
MARY ANNE WARREN, MORAL STATUS: OBLIGATIONS TO PERSONS AND OTHER
LIVING THINGS 3 (1997).
67. 21 C.F.R. § 314.600 (2018). There is nevertheless a long history of exposing human
subjects to very harmful pathogens, including smallpox and yellow fever. SUSAN E.
LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO SCIENCE: HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN AMERICA BEFORE
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 4, 19–21 (1995).
68. GUIDE FOR CARE AND USE, supra note 58, at 1.
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important to note that assuming responsibility for animal well-being is
compatible with a view that does not grant animals direct moral
status. That is because animals whose well-being is supported are
generally better sources of reliable scientific data.69 Thus, the goal of
assuming such responsibility may simply be promoting the goals of
the science rather than the direct value of the animals themselves. By
contrast, the E.U. framework directly recognizes that “[a]nimals have
an intrinsic value which must be respected.”70 The European Union’s
notion of intrinsic value cannot be mistaken for the animal’s
instrumental value, thus going beyond the moral status implications
of the U.S. guidance.
B.

The E.U.’s Harm-Benefit Analysis Requirement

Specific features of the E.U. oversight that are not mirrored in
the U.S. system further concretize a difference in the moral status
each system grants to animals used in biomedical research. First,
there is a specific requirement in the European Union for a harmbenefit analysis of research protocols before they can be approved.71
These harm-benefit analyses do not operate on a philosophical
utilitarian model of giving equal consideration to like interests
regardless of species.72 However, the requirement for such an analysis
itself supports the idea that harms to animals must be balanced to
some determinate degree against potential human (or other animal)
benefit, and an ethical proposal must be able to legitimately claim
that the benefits will outweigh the harms to a reasonable degree.73 In
any given system of harm-benefit calculation, the extent to which
animal harms are discounted relative to human benefit exposes an
unequal weight given to their ethical consideration. Whether or how
this can be justified is a matter for considerable philosophical
debate.74 Nevertheless, the requirement to conduct a harm-benefit
analysis itself is a signal of the European Union taking animal moral
value seriously, whether discounted relative to human value or not.

69. See Carbone, supra note 9, at 1–5.
70. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶ 12, at 34.
71. Id. art. 38(2)(d), at 47.
72. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 20–21 (Pimlico, 2d ed. 1995) (1990).
73. See Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, art. 38, at 46–47.
74. See Rebecca L. Walker & Nancy M. P. King, Biodefense Research and the U.S.
Regulatory Structure: Whither Nonhuman Primate Moral Standing?, 21 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 277, 277–310 (2011).
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In the United States, the weighing of animal harm against
potential human benefit is not similarly prioritized. The U.S.
Government Principles contain the general admonition that
“[p]rocedures involving animals should be designed and performed
with due consideration of their relevance to human or animal health,
the advancement of knowledge, or the good of society.”75 However,
these vague appeals to scientific relevance are not carried through in
any concrete requirement for a harm-benefit analysis within the
IACUC protocol assessment.76 While the process of undergoing
review for National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) grant funding does
include rigorous assessment by both a peer group of scientists and an
advisory council that includes public representation, that process also
does not explicitly balance potential benefits against the harms to
animals required to achieve those benefits. Thus, unlike in humansubject ethics review,77 in the United States animal subject protocols
are not necessarily assessed for their likely net value.
C.

The E.U.’s Upper Pain Threshold

A third difference between the U.S. and E.U. systems is that the
United States lacks an upper limit to admissible pain or distress of
animals used in scientific research. In the United States, there are
significant requirements that researchers “avoid or minimize
discomfort” and distress to animals.78 In particular, the requirements
apply to the use of analgesics when animals will experience pain and
euthanizing animals when needed as a humane endpoint.79 However,
these requirements are circumscribed by the needs of science.
Accordingly, if a scientific justification can be given to withhold
analgesics or to cause severe pain or distress, the science takes
precedence. This could occur when pain itself is being studied so that
animal suffering is mandatory to achieve the study objective. For
example, a study of the potential efficacy of new pain drugs requires
pain to be inflicted on animal subjects to test whether the drug
alleviated that pain. The same reasoning also applies if offering pain
75. U.S. Government Principles for Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals Used
in Testing, Research and Training, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,864, 20,864 (May 20, 1985).
76. See Larry Carbone, Justification for the Use of Animals, in THE IACUC
HANDBOOK 211, 211–36 (Jerald Silverman, Mark A. Suckow & Sreekant Murthy eds., 3d
ed. 2014).
77. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 1352.235–70 to .235–73 (2018) (outlining the review process for
research involving human subjects).
78. 9 C.F.R. § 2.31(d) (2018).
79. Id. § 2.31(d)(i), (iv)–(v); PHS POLICY, supra note 48, at 4.
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relief would interfere with the data being collected and thus the
validity of the study,80 such as when the use of analgesics is avoided in
animal studies because analgesics alter the animal’s physiological
response.81 The IACUC review, then, must either ensure that
appropriate analgesics are employed when procedures cause more
than minimal pain or otherwise approve a scientific justification for
withholding such pain relief.82 An upper limit on permissible animal
suffering83 offers an ethical limitation on what may be done to animals
for the sake of human benefit and suggests, in principle, that animals
have some determinate moral status. Alternatively, if permissible
pain and suffering is conditioned by the needs of science, where the
ethical value of the scientific intervention is not independently
assessed, then arguably animals are deprived of a moral status in
exchange for their rote scientific value. It is important to note that the
European Union also allows requirements for analgesia to be
overridden by scientific justification.84 The difference is in the upper
limit of allowable pain established in the E.U. framework.
D. The Three Rs in Practice
As noted above, the internationally recognized ethical
framework supporting and guiding animal research is the three Rs:
reduction, refinement, and replacement. The contrasting approaches
to the three Rs between the U.S. and E.U. systems raise somewhat
more vague implications for animal moral standing. These “principles
of humane experimental technique”85 are central to the European
Union’s commitment to diminishing a reliance on animal research
80. Jerrold Tannenbaum, Ethics and Pain Research in Animals, 40 INST. FOR
LABORATORY ANIMAL RES. J. 97, 97–110 (1999).
81. Carbone, supra note 9, at 6.
82. 9 C.F.R. § 2.31(d)(iv)(A) (2018); see also Alicia Z. Karas & Jerald Silverman, Pain
and Distress, in THE IACUC HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at 317, 326–27.
83. The E.U. Directive 2010/63 remains silent regarding the specific threshold of
permissible pain and suffering. However, the Directive lists in Annex VIII several
procedures classified as “severe” (i.e., not reaching the upper limit and so still
permissible), particularly “(a) toxicity testing where death is the end-point, . . . (b) testing
of device where failure may cause severe pain, distress or death of the animal (e.g., cardiac
assist devices); . . . [and] (m) forced swim or exercise tests with exhaustion as the endpoint.” Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, annex VIII, sec. III(3), at 79. There is thus
a question about the practical significance of an “upper limit” to pain in terms of animal
protection. Nevertheless, having such a limit established in law does not offer a conceptual
framework that allows for the extension of direct moral standing to animals used in
research.
84. Id. art. 14, at 42.
85. RUSSELL & BURCH, supra note 4, at 64.
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overall.86 In the United States, the three Rs have been implicit in the
regulatory guidance but only explicitly mentioned in the more recent
versions of the Guide as a “practical strategy for decision making”
regarding the use of animals.87 Moreover, there generally appears to
be less commitment in the U.S. system to the idea that animal use in
science is provisional. While E.U. Directive 2010/63 states that the use
of live animals “continues to be necessary,”88 the U.S. Government
Principles simply state that “[t]he development of knowledge
necessary for the improvement of the health and well-being of
humans as well as other animals requires in vivo experimentation with
a wide variety of animal species.”89 Further, in the United States, the
use of alternatives such as “mathematical models, computer
simulation, and in vitro biological systems should be considered” but
are not mandated.90 While the differences between the two
jurisdictions’ emphasis on the three Rs are a matter of interpretation,
it is significant that the European Union generally puts greater
emphasis on the provisional nature of the use of animals in research.
This relative focus on the three Rs in the European Union supports,
at least in principle, the view that animals are ethically valuable and
that their use is a moral problem that may be solved by phasing out
that use over time.91
E.

U.S. Species-Specific Protections

In addition to the differences between the U.S. and E.U. systems
relative to the general moral status of research animals, the U.S.
system has its own set of species-specific protections that are worth
noting. As noted above, the AWA only covers certain species of
warm-blooded vertebrate animals used in research. In current
practice, mice in particular are widely subject to gene editing, and
these animals are not covered by the AWA. Within the AWA there is
specific mention of a requirement for “exercise of dogs” and “for a
physical environment adequate to promote the psychological well-

86. See Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶¶ 10, 39, art. 1, at 34, 36, 38–
39.

87. GUIDE FOR CARE AND USE, supra note 58, at 3.
88. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶ 10, at 34 (emphasis added).
89. U.S. Government Principles for Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals Used
in Testing, Research and Training, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,864, 20,864 (May 20, 1985) (emphasis
added).
90. Id.
91. See Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶ 11, at 34.
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being of primates.”92 Thus, both dogs and primates receive special
protections under the AWA. Other than these special protections, the
AWA and attending regulations generally require keeping individual
records for dogs and cats, as well as for primates acquired and used in
research,93 and dictate the need for species-appropriate living
conditions that contribute to the animals’ “health and comfort.”94
Both the AWA and PHS Policy regulations and guidance generally
require that there be a scientific justification for the appropriateness
of the species used in a protocol.95 Finally, best practices for
laboratory animal euthanasia depend on the particular species.96
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.-E.U. REGULATORY SYSTEM
DIFFERENCES FOR THE INCREASED USE OF GENE-EDITED LARGEANIMAL MODELS
While the United States and European Union are similar in
terms of their rigorous and extensive oversight of animal research
practices—and are among the most thorough oversight systems in the
world—this Article has noted both practical and conceptual
differences in how the systems are structured. How do these
differences impact the ethics and policy implications of a greater use
of gene-edited large-animal models? It may appear initially that the
E.U. system is more likely to place hurdles in the way of such use due
to its greater emphasis on animal moral status and the three Rs.
However, as we shall argue, that is not necessarily the case.
In this part, we first spell out in further detail why we believe the
three Rs cannot offer conclusive guidance regarding an increased use
of gene-edited large-animal models. We then proceed by going stepby-step through the E.U. project evaluation process to consider where
it might offer guidance on the issue of gene modification of largeanimal models. Next, we consider how the upper limit on pain in the
E.U. regulations engages the issue. Finally, we consider what speciesspecific protections in the United States and in the European Union

92. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(B) (2012).
93. See Angela M. Mexas & Diane J. Gaertner, Amending IACUC Protocols, in THE
IACUC HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at 177, 192.
94. 9 C.F.R. § 2.31(d)(iv)(A) (2018).
95. See Mexas & Gaertner, supra note 93, at 181.
96. See AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, AVMA GUIDELINES FOR THE EUTHANASIA
OF ANIMALS: 2013 EDITION 48–51 (2013), https://www.avma.org/KB/Policies/Documents/
euthanasia.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8H8-4G7G].
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may offer. Through this process, we show why neither system inhibits
a move to greater use of gene-edited large-animal models.
The three Rs, as the ethical framework underlying the
responsible conduct of animal research, contain internal conflict. The
conflict that is crucial for this Article, as previously discussed, is
primarily between reduction and relative replacement. However,
there are additional tensions within the three Rs, as well as conflicting
interpretations of the individual Rs. Reduction, for example, is
understood by animal protectionists as reduction of the total number
of animals used in research.97 However, those promoting animal
research understand the mandate as an increase in efficiency by using
the fewest animals needed for individual protocols and/or increasing
information gained from each animal.98 This second interpretation
also raises the potential of reusing animals to further the aim of
reduction.99 Such reuse, however, may be in conflict with refinement,
which aims to lessen the harm to each individual animal.100 These
conflicts in balancing and understanding the three Rs are significant
because, ultimately, the tension between reduction and relative
replacement in using large numbers of small animals versus small
numbers of large animals is a tension that the professional ethical
framework of animal research is incapable or unwilling to resolve.
This ethical tension is thus reflected in the lack of guidance within the
regulatory structures.
Animal use in the European Union is, in coordination with the
three Rs, regulated by a prospective project evaluation. Does a
project evaluation (which, among other items, entails a mandatory
harm-benefit analysis) give guidance on how to resolve this tension
between reduction and relative replacement that is apparent in an
increased use of genetically modified large animals? The European
Union’s initial project evaluation procedure requires affirming that a
project is justified from a scientific or educational point of view or
required by law and that the project’s purpose justifies the use of
animals.101 Moreover, the purpose of the experiment has to fall within
97. See I. Anna S. Olsson et al., The 3Rs Principle – Mind the Ethical Gap!, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH WORLD CONGRESS ON ALTERNATIVES AND ANIMAL USE IN
THE LIFE SCIENCES, MONTREAL 2011, at 333, 333–34 (2012).
98. Id.
99. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, art. 16, at 42.
100. M.J. de Boo et al., The Interplay Between Replacement, Reduction and Refinement:
Considerations Where the Three Rs Interact, 14 ANIMAL WELFARE 327, 328 (2005).
101. Project evaluation is mainly regulated according to Article 38 in the E.U.
Directive 2010/63. See Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, art. 38, at 46–47.
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the listed legal purposes for animal use, such as basic or translational
research, education, or regulatory tests, among others.102 This step is
primarily a scientific evaluation of the relevance of the research goal
and whether the research design is appropriate to acquire the
knowledge sought.
Next, the project must demonstrate compliance with the three
Rs. According to the European Union, the species with the lowest
capacity to suffer should be used, but emphasis remains on
guaranteeing the optimal potential for translation of the results into
the target species—most often humans.103 If the knowledge gained
from rodent studies can sufficiently be translated to the human
condition, there would seem to be no justification to use larger
animals in their stead. However, the low translatability of research
findings has partially been attributed to the limitations of rodents as
models for human diseases.104 For this reason, the species with the
lowest capacity to suffer that also brings about the most satisfactory
results might not be rodents but larger animals such as dogs, pigs, or
NHPs. Based on this logic, if the only satisfactory results can be
obtained from large-animal models, and if any animals are used, then
only these models should be used.
The next requirement in project evaluation is a severity
assessment of the procedures involved and a harm-benefit analysis to
weigh the interests of animals.105 A harm-benefit analysis relies on a
modified utilitarian framework (i.e., one that discounts to some
extent animal welfare in relation to human welfare), according to
which even significant harms to animals are justifiable as long as the
expected benefit is large enough.106 The specific language of the E.U.
Directive 2010/63 calls for “taking into account ethical
considerations”107 in balancing harms and benefits; however, what
exactly “ethical consideration” means in this context remains

102. Id. art. 5, at 40.
103. See id. pmbl. ¶ 13, at 34; id. art. 13, at 42 (expressing preference for procedures
which “(a) use the minimum number of animals; (b) involve animals with the lowest
capacity to experience pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm; (c) cause the least pain,
suffering, distress or lasting harm; and are most likely to provide satisfactory results”).
104. van der Worp et al., supra note 18, at 5 (“[T]he translation of [rodent study]
results to the clinic may fail because of disparities between the model and the clinical trials
testing the treatment strategy.”).
105. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, art. 38(2)(d), at 47.
106. Id. annex VIII, sec. III(3), at 79.
107. Id. art. 38(2)(d), at 47.
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elusive.108 Nevertheless, there are some indications regarding ethical
considerations in the E.U.’s regulatory guidance. First, as discussed
above, it is linked to the notion that all sentient animals have intrinsic
value that must be respected and thus their use should be restricted to
areas that may ultimately benefit humans, animals, or the
environment.109 Second, the use of animals in research is only morally
justified if the potential gain is sufficiently important.110 Yet the
concept of ethical guidance in the E.U. Directive 2010/63 gives no
specification at all on how to weigh the use of one species over
another within a harm-benefit analysis. Thus, we must extrapolate.
The potential for the generation of better (i.e., more
translatable) large-animal models represents a potentially significant
gain on the benefit side within the harm-benefit analysis as we have
already addressed. However, since large-animal models are typically
also more cognitively developed, their complex needs and interests
call for a focus on refinement to induce as little suffering as possible
through accommodating their special housing needs, providing
adequate stimuli, and facilitating appropriate social interaction.111
Further, hindrances to the specific social, psychological, and
accommodation needs of these animals should be taken into
consideration as harms of research in addition to those of the
experimental intervention.112 Overall, the potential for increased
suffering of large animals used in research must be outweighed by
both the potential increase in benefit to humans, animals, or the
environment, as well as the reduced numbers of animals used. In
short, using a harm-benefit analysis, it is possible that genetically
modifying large-animal models will increase individual animal
108. See Herwig Grimm, Ethics Within Legal Limits: Harm-Benefit Analysis According
to the Directive 2010/63/EU, in KNOW YOUR FOOD: FOOD ETHICS AND INNOVATION 42,
42–46 (Diana Elena Dumitras, Ionel Mugurel Jitea & Stef Aerts eds., 2015).
109. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶ 12, at 34.
110. Id. pmbl. ¶ 39, at 36.
111. See Anna Catarina Vieira de Castro & I. Anna S. Olsson, Does the Goal Justify
the Methods? Harm and Benefit in Neuroscience Research Using Animals, in CURRENT
TOPICS IN BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCES 47, 57–63 (Grace Lee, Judy Illes & Frauke Ohl
eds., 2015).
112. The use of cognitively higher-developed animals requires appropriate measures to
be taken to ensure species-appropriate housing and behavior. See id. at 60–62. In
particular, the European Union requires: “(a) all animals are provided with
accommodation, an environment, food, water and care which are appropriate to their
health and well-being; [and] (b) any restrictions on the extent to which an animal can
satisfy its physiological and ethological needs are kept to a minimum.” Council Directive
2010/63, supra note 9, art. 33, at 45–46.
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suffering; however, under the assumption that fewer animals are used
and that more effective animal research would result, absolute
suffering could still be reduced. Based on the logic of the harmbenefit analysis, then, the fact that cognitively higher-developed
animals may have a larger capacity to suffer than rodents does not
disqualify them from use in animal research as long as the harm
inflicted on them is outweighed by the benefit.113
Another article of the E.U. Directive 2010/63 that warrants
discussion regarding the use of gene-edited large-animal models is the
establishment of an upper limit on pain and distress in biomedical
research. Preamble 23 of the E.U. Directive 2010/63 states as follows:
From an ethical standpoint, there should be an upper limit of
pain, suffering and distress above which animals should not be
subjected in scientific procedures. To that end, the performance
of procedures that result in severe pain, suffering or distress,
which is likely to be long-lasting and cannot be ameliorated,
should be prohibited.114
The concept of an upper limit on acceptable pain is interesting with
regard to the belief that cognitively higher-developed animals have an
increased ability to suffer. Depending on where that upper limit is, it
is conceivable that higher-developed animals are more prone to reach
that threshold compared to rodents. However, dogs, pigs, and NHP
are used in harmful biomedical research, implying that regulators do
not consider their use to automatically reach that threshold. Yet there
is a legitimate concern that some animal models with genetic
disorders such as “Huntington’s disease, Muscular dystrophy, [and]
chronic relapsing neuritis” are expected to experience severe and
persistent suffering.115 With regard to genetically modified largeanimal models for specific devastating human diseases, then, it would
113. It is interesting to note, despite this Article’s analysis, that a recent AALASFELASA working group publication on harm-benefit analysis considered the use of
eighty-seven pigs for a study to be of much greater harm compared to a study that used
nine hundred mice. See generally Kathy Laber et al., Recommendations for Addressing
Harm–Benefit Analysis and Implementation in Ethical Evaluation – Report from the
AALAS–FELASA Working Group on Harm–Benefit Analysis – Part 2, 50 LABORATORY
ANIMALS (SUPP. 1) 21, 21–42 (2016). The implication from this assessment is that the
trend toward use of larger animals may, in practice, only be encouraged if the benefit is
significantly higher compared to the benefit of a study in smaller animals. There clearly is
also a perceived higher ethical barrier to using large-animal models even though no
specific guidance to this effect is available in the E.U. Directive 2010/63.
114. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶ 23, at 35.
115. Id. annex VIII, sec. III(3)(h), at 79.
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need to be decided on a case-by-case basis whether this upper pain
threshold is reached.116
Thus, the upper limit on pain in animal studies does not appear
to rule out the use of gene-edited large-animal models, even
potentially for quite devastating human diseases. It is telling from an
animal moral status point of view that the U.S. regulatory structure
requires neither a specific harm-benefit analysis nor suggests an upper
limit on admissible pain and suffering. Yet as illustrated here, the
project evaluation in the European Union seems to place few hurdles
to the use of gene-edited large animals even with these safeguards in
place. Thus, nothing in our analysis of either the E.U. or U.S.
regulatory structures would inhibit moving to gene-edited largeanimal models as a favored option to tackle intransigent human
diseases.
Only the species-specific protections in each set of regulations
remain as potential barriers. E.U. Directive 2010/63 requires that
great apes should only be used in research under exceptional
circumstances, such as preservation of the species and only for human
interests under life-threatening circumstances.117 In the United States,
protections for chimpanzees in particular have evolved as a matter of
institutional decisionmaking on the part of the NIH, culminating in a
2015 determination to no longer fund chimpanzee research.118 The
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service determined in that same year that
chimpanzees are an endangered species.119 Thus, while chimpanzee
research is not illegal in the United States, hurdles to performing such
research are extremely high.
116. What actually constitutes the upper limit threshold is never made explicit in the
E.U. Directive 2010/63. See, e.g., id. annex VIII, at 76–79 (listing “[s]everity categories” of
pain but not an upper limit). Severe suffering is still considered within an acceptable
range, and a few examples of “severe” suffering include “breeding animals with genetic
disorders that are expected to experience severe and persistent impairment of general
condition, for example, Huntington’s disease, Muscular dystrophy, chronic relapsing
neuritis models.” Id. annex VIII, sec. III(3)(h), at 79. Other nongenetic examples include
“inescapable electric shock (e.g. to produce learned helplessness)” or “complete isolation
for prolonged periods of social species e.g. dogs and non-human primates.” Id. annex VIII,
sec. III(3)(k), at 79.
117. Id. pmbl. ¶ 18, at 35.
118. Francis S. Collins, NIH Will No Longer Support Biomedical Research on
Chimpanzees, NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.nih.gov/aboutnih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/nih-will-no-longer-support-biomedical-researchchimpanzees [https://perma.cc/9328-P9JE].
119. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing All Chimpanzees as
Endangered Species, 80 Fed. Reg., 34,500, 34,500 (June 16, 2015) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17).
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Regarding the use of other NHPs, E.U. Directive 2010/63 notes
both the continuing “necessity” of their use and also notes that such
use raises “specific ethical and practical problems in terms of meeting
their behavioural, environmental, and social needs in a laboratory
environment.”120 These problems, along with social concern about the
use of NHPs, leads to restrictions on their use to basic research,
species preservation, or in relation to life-threatening or debilitating
human conditions.121 Importantly, E.U. Directive 2010/63 specifically
states that there needs to be “scientific justification to the effect that
the purpose of the procedure cannot be achieved by the use of species
other than non-human primates.”122 Thus, there appears to be an
effort to keep NHPs as a “last resort” model to address human
disease and disability. However, given the good fit of NHPs as models
for some human disease conditions, along with the fact that those
diseases are frequently debilitating,123 there is good reason to think
many of the uses of gene-edited NHPs may be approved under these
restrictions.
While the U.S. regulations also require species-specific
justification for the use of animals in scientific research and also

120. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶ 17, at 34.
121. The E.U. Directive 2010/63 preamble states in full:
Having regard to the present state of scientific knowledge, the use of non-human
primates in scientific procedures is still necessary in biomedical research. Due to
their genetic proximity to human beings and to their highly developed social skills,
the use of non-human primates in scientific procedures raises specific ethical and
practical problems in terms of meeting their behavioural, environmental and social
needs in a laboratory environment. Furthermore, the use of non-human primates
is of the greatest concern to the public. Therefore the use of non-human primates
should be permitted only in those biomedical areas essential for the benefit of
human beings, for which no other alternative replacement methods are yet
available. Their use should be permitted only for basic research, the preservation
of the respective non-human primate species or when the work, including
xenotransplantation, is carried out in relation to potentially life-threatening
conditions in humans or in relation to cases having a substantial impact on a
person’s day-to-day functioning, i.e. debilitating conditions.
Id. pmbl. ¶ 17, at 34–35.
122. Id. art. 8, at 40. Although here it is important to note that the safeguard clause
also allows the use of NHPs by an E.U. member “where the use is not undertaken with a
view to the avoidance, prevention, diagnosis or treatment of debilitating or potentially lifethreatening clinical conditions, [the E.U. member] may adopt a provisional measure
allowing such use, provided the purpose cannot be achieved by the use of species other
than non-human primates.” Id. art. 55, at 50.
123. Such debilitating diseases that could be modeled by NHP may include, for
example, Huntington’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, and many others.
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embrace the idea that the species with the least capacity to suffer
ought to be used,124 these regulations neither require a special
justification for the use of NHPs nor restrict their use to the particular
purposes outlined by E.U. Directive 2010/63. In the United States, by
contrast, the most apparent oversight difference between the use of
dogs, pigs, primates, other large animals, and rodents is in the lack of
coverage of rodents by the AWA.125 Practically, this means a lack of
unannounced site inspections by USDA officers, a lack of reporting
requirements regarding pain categories and subject numbers for
rodents, and the absence of some particular requirements (such as
evidence of a search for alternatives to the use of live animals).126 As
noted, the other special protections that the AWA grants in particular
to dogs and primates are for exercise for dogs and attention to
psychological well-being for primates. Both of these protections are in
regard to appropriate housing and caretaking and neither give any
special reason to think that gene-editing interventions would
contravene them.
In sum, even though cats, dogs, and NHPs have specific standing
in E.U. Directive 2010/63, as well as in the U.S. regulatory system,
their use for scientific purposes is nonetheless allowed and only the
use of NHPs is explicitly restricted in the European Union.127 Pigs do
not receive special protection in either regulatory framework, though
they are covered by the AWA.128 Against the background of the
translatability crisis of animal research in general and rodent studies
in particular, E.U. Directive 2010/63 does not, based on our analysis,
present reasons to oppose a turn toward using cognitively higherdeveloped animals over cognitively less-developed animals, as long as
a sufficient scientific rationale for the experiment is given. As nothing
in the U.S. regulations overall offers greater levels of protection of
large animals, there is no reason to think any greater resistance to
gene-edited large-animal models would occur in that setting.
124. See supra Section III.E.
125. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2012).
126. SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND ANIMALS, supra note 60, at 30; Karas & Silverman,
supra note 82, at 339–40; Ernest D. Prentice, Gwenn S. F. Oki & Michael D. Mann,
General Concepts of Protocol Review, in THE IACUC HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at 139,
139–40.
127. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶ 33, at 36 (“Non-human primates,
dogs and cats should have a personal history file from birth covering their lifetimes in
order to be able to receive the care, accommodation and treatment that meet their
individual needs and characteristics.”).
128. § 2132(g).
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V. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE U.S. AND E.U.
FRAMEWORKS
We have identified limited areas in which the gene editing of
large-animal models will not be considered ethically viable under the
regulations, primarily within the E.U. legislation. Examples include
the use of NHPs that are not within the approved purposes of
research or for which animals other than NHPs can be used with
equal efficacy. Also, unacceptable uses will be found where the
perceived research benefits do not outweigh the animal harm or
where the animals will suffer beyond a very high maximal threshold
(as might be the case for certain devastating genetic conditions).
Further, it is clear from both U.S. and E.U. regulatory standards that
large animals require species-appropriate housing, caretaking, and
“enrichment,”129 as well as species-specific euthanasia methods.130
However, these requirements are not specific to gene-edited animals,
and since all large-animal species that are likely to be used for geneedited purposes are already in use in invasive biomedical research,
these constraints likely will not limit their use for gene-editing
purposes.
In a sense, these conclusions are not surprising given that neither
the U.S. nor the E.U. regulatory framework, despite being among the
most stringent in the world, aims to manage overall trends in animal
research from an ethical viewpoint. Indeed, neither contains any
means to critically assess such trends. At the same time, as we have
also pointed out, there are important differences between the two
regulatory frameworks such that it is at least arguable that the E.U.
framework grants research animals, in general, a higher moral status
than in the U.S. framework. It may seem to follow from a greater
emphasis on animal moral status that animals capable of greater
suffering and more complex social, cognitive, and emotional
capacities will be protected from highly invasive and/or harmful
experiments. However, as we have discussed, even NHPs do not seem
protected against being used in larger numbers to better model
devastating human diseases in either regulatory framework.
One conclusion could be that the higher moral status of research
animals in the European Union has little significant practical
importance in terms of the protection of research animals. Yet certain
types of NHP research have received added scrutiny and have even
129. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, annex III, sec. A(3.3)(b), at 56.
130. See AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra note 96, at 6–7.
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been halted in the European Union and in Switzerland. In Bremen,
Germany, for example, the license of a macaque researcher was not
renewed because his work involving fixation of macaques in the
primate chair to record their brains while performing simple tasks was
deemed to be “too far from applications” and because “it is ethically
not justifiable to inflict this kind of pain on animals for the generation
of neurobiological basic knowledge.”131 However, the highest court in
Germany later overturned this refusal to renew the project license.132
A similar case happened in 2006 in Zurich when authorities declined
to renew a license for primate work.133 The authorities ruled that the
work, which had a goal to map the functional microcircuitry of the
brain of macaques, offended the dignity of the animals and would not
generate practical benefits in the foreseeable future.134 Decisions like
these imply that a greater use of large-animal models may be
perceived as justified only as long as the promise of translational
efficiency is salient to those reviewing the research.
While there are no features of the current regulatory guidance in
the United States or the European Union that we identified as
necessarily inhibiting a trend to greater use of gene-edited largeanimal models, there are broader ethical implications of such a trend
that are critical to considering its overall acceptability. We raise these
briefly here but note that they deserve much greater attention than
we give them in the context of this Article, focused as it is on the
regulatory implications of such a trend.
One set of issues has to do with whether some genetic
manipulations, for example brain enhancements, might themselves
incur greater sentience and thus a more significant ability to suffer in
large animals. This is a particularly salient concern for NHPs, whose
131. Herwig Grimm et al., The Road to Hell Is Paved with Good Intentions: Why
Harm-Benefit Analysis and Its Emphasis on Practical Benefit Jeopardizes the Credibility of
Research, 7 ANIMALS, no. 7090070, Sept. 11, 2017, at 1, 2 (translating
Oberverwaltungsgericht der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, FREIE HANSESTADT BREMEN
(Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.oberverwaltungsgericht.bremen.de/sixcms/detail.php?gsid=
bremen72.c.11099.de&asl=bremen72.c.11265 [https://perma.cc/V2BK-DMJA]); see also
Quirin Schiermeier, German Authority Halts Primate Work, 455 NATURE 1159, 1159
(2008).
132. Hristio Boytchev, Campaign Targeting Animal Experimenter Causes Uproar in
Germany, SCIENCE (May 7, 2014, 4:45 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/05/
campaign-targeting-animal-experimenter-causes-uproar-germany [https://perma.cc/JQ4MHJXH].
133. Alison Abbot, Basel Declaration Defends Animal Research, 468 NATURE 742, 742
(2010).
134. Id.

97 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2019)

2019]

REPLACING GENE-EDITED ANIMALS

1269

cognitive capacities are already so similar to our own. Closely tied to
this concern is the critique that the moral status implications of the
E.U. legislation do not go far enough. On that view, it is not enough
to grant harms to animals like dogs and primates a higher weight than
harms to rodents in a harm-benefit analysis; rather, these animals
should be granted a moral status such that they simply are not used in
harmful animal research. Of course, if that is the case, then the move
to gene-edited large-animal models will be blocked out of the gate. A
related, but theoretically very different, approach would be to claim
that it is simply not the case that the social, emotional, and cognitive
needs of these larger mammals can be adequately met within the
confines of a research facility. Should this empirical claim be proven
true, and under the assumption that meeting those needs is a
precursor to the ethical use of any animals, it may be argued as a
matter of practical necessity that such animals should not be used.
A final theoretical point falls along the lines of a utilitarian
critique of the harm-benefit analysis within the E.U. regulatory
framework. Opponents might argue that within the normative
framework of E.U. Directive 2010/63, animal interests are discounted
beyond what is ethically acceptable. This criticism is based on the fact
that even the fairly remote promise of human benefit might justify
quite serious actual harms to animals according to the current
practices associated with harm-benefit analyses. Thus, a more
balanced equitable consideration of harms and benefits will justify far
less in the way of animal research generally, including the use of geneedited large-animal models. Of course, such an argument leaves
completely open the idea that some uses of gene-edited large animals
could well be justified, especially if they promise particularly
compelling health advances for recalcitrant human diseases.
The ethical concerns that may be raised with the greater use of
gene-edited large animals in biomedical research largely fall outside
the scope of the regulatory framework for animal research that we
have discussed. However, there are important precursors to these
potential concerns within the regulatory frameworks themselves,
especially within the E.U. framework. For example, the idea of the
requirement for a harm-benefit analysis as an ethical justification for
animal research is a necessary step in moving toward a more
equitable treatment of animal interests within such an analysis.
Similarly, the idea that certain harms are out of bounds for sentient
animals even if they may bear fruit scientifically is a conceptual step
toward the idea that animals in research may have certain rights in
regard to how they are utilized. Finally, the concern about species-
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specific housing, caretaking, social needs, etc., when taken to its
logical endpoint, may lead to a concern that it is potentially
impossible for animal confinement facilities to adequately meet
complex social, emotional, and cognitive needs of certain types of
animals (even more so if those animals are cognitively enhanced by
genetic means).
One way of seeing this set of issues is that, in so far as they sign
onto the three Rs, and in particular to replacement as incrementally
realizable, animal scientists generally agree that harmful animal use is
less than ideal and that the ultimate goal ought to be ending the
harmful use of sentient animals.135 Put in that way, the question
resulting from the use of greater numbers of gene-edited large
animals may be a question of what means we might be willing to
endorse to achieve that broader goal of ending harm to sentient
animals. If gene-edited large animals are such excellent models for
humans that their use will bring a quicker end to the harmful use of
animals in biomedicine overall, is that grounds for those uses?
Alternatively, the use of NHPs has raised concerns due to their
ethically salient similarities to humans. If genetically modified NHPs
are such good models of human disease (because they are even more
humanlike), then their use raises concerns akin to the uses of humans
for these same kinds of experiments and raises the question whether
they, by genetic modification, would reach a limit on permissible use
independently of potential benefit.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that neither the U.S. nor E.U. regulatory
frameworks offer guidance on a trend toward greater use of geneedited large animals in place of larger numbers of small-animal
models. Moreover, we have suggested that the promise of greater
gains in translation and efficiency are powerful forces that are likely
to move the science community to embrace such trends in the name
of a professional ethic that views animal use as justified mainly by its
positive benefit. Further, the professional ethical framework
governing animal research, the three Rs, itself contains internal
tensions that make it incapable of offering significant guidance on this
topic over and above the regulatory framework itself. This state of
135. This is reflected in the E.U. 2010/63 Directive’s ultimate goal of ceasing animal
experimentation as soon as adequate nonanimal alternative methods are available.
Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶ 10, at 34.
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affairs leads us to ask: Is the use of genetically modified large animals
in order to realize the eventual goal of phasing out invasive animal
research a step in the right direction? Alternatively, do increased uses
of gene-edited large mammals like dogs, pigs, and NHPs undercut the
very moral sensibilities that motivated this goal in the first place? This
Article leaves this conundrum for our readers to consider.
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